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Introduction 
Are the social domains of kinship and business on balance 
complementary or contradictory? Do ventures that invest heavily in 
both – conventionally referred to as “family firms” - bear a net gain or 
net loss? We are scarcely the first to raise these questions. How then 
will we try to contribute to an answer? We try this in five ways, all of 
them based on previous literature. First, we develop the dichotomy of 
kinship and business by taking seriously the metaphor of yin and yang, 
merging it with the anthropological constructs of structural domains 
such as “domestic” and “public.” This metaphor proves to shed light on 
the relevant literature. Second, we provide a qualitative survey of the 
costs and benefits of kinship in business. Third, we summarize the 
empirical work that addresses the performance outcomes from family 
involvement. Fourth, we consider the practitioner implications of these 
studies. Finally, we ask if scholars are as yet in a position to answer 
these questions. 
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The Structural Domains of Kinship and Business 
Let us imagine two domains, first the domain of kinship and 
marriage, second the domain of commerce and economy.  Following 
Fortes (1969: 97), by “domain” we mean a sector of social life with a 
distinctive “range of social relations, customs, norms, [and] statuses… 
unified by the stamp of distinctive functional features”. Based on 
anthropological kinship theory (e.g., Bloch, 1973; Fortes, 1969; Jones, 
2005) we generate a set of correlative pairs, which (following Jones, 
2005) we call Structural Dualism One: 
 
                    Domain A                                   Domain B 
                      Kinship                                    Business 
                    Domestic                                  Politico-jural 
                     Private                                     Public 
                      Nature                                     Culture 
                      Female                                       Male 
Long-term generalized reciprocity Short-term balanced reciprocity 
 
The yin-yang metaphor 
Unsurprisingly this sort of dualism has generated controversy, 
particularly among feminist scholars (Rotman, 2006, Smith, 2009). As 
these critics have documented, the extent to which this dualism has 
been accepted is historically contingent (Comaroff, 1987; di Leonardo, 
1987; Jones, 2005).  Nonetheless, binary thinking along these lines 
has had a long history in many cultures. The most elaborated version 
of this thinking is the ancient Chinese yin-yang cosmology.  In this 
cosmology, one side (our Domain A) is yin (陰) and the other (our 
Domain B) is yang (陽), terms that in this cosmology “subsume” all 
other “complementary” pairs”(Allen, 1997: 59). Following Cheng 
(2008) and Graham (1989), we take some of the fundamental pairs 
within this extensive set of paradigms to generate Structural Dualism 
Two: 
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   Domain A                                Domain B 
                       Yin                                             Yang 
                   Darkness                                 Sunlight 
                       Cold                                    Heat 
                       Earth                                  Heaven 
                     Passivity                                   Action 
                     Softness                                 Strength 
                      Female                                    Male 
 
Within this worldview, the right or yang side is considered 
“dominant” (Cheng, 2008: 223). Therefore, as with Dualism One, this 
set lends itself readily to sexist, and indeed “feudal,” ideology (Cheng, 
2008: 224; Li, 2000: 34-36; Jones, 2005). Greenhalgh (1994) 
provides an excellent example of the use of this ideology by patriarchs 
of family firms. However, it is not only females – and the young – who 
can be marginalized by these dichotomies, so also can family business 
itself. After all, family firms are precisely those organizations that 
invest energy and derive resources substantially in both domains. 
Therefore, we find in the family firm literature sufficient material to 
derive a dualism based on the real or imagined differences in 
managerial philosophy. Following Benedict (1968), Jones (2005), and 
Stewart (2003; 2008) we derive Structural Dualism Three: 
 
      Domain A (yin)                             Domain B (yang) 
                 Family firms                               Non-family firms 
                 Amateurism                                Professionalism 
                  Informality                                     Formality 
               Private and secret                       Public and open 
            Functional diffuseness                    Functional specificity 
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                    Ascription                                   Achievement 
            Nurturance and indulgence                     Competition  
                 Consumption                                     Production 
                 Subjectivity                                    Objectivity 
 
This dualism is, like the others, ideologically charged and 
potentially most misleading. Clearly, this dualism rests on the first, 
that of kinship and business (if not also, in China, on yin and yang). 
Therefore, its underlying assumptions tend to be those of Structural 
Dualism One, not least of which is the great divide between 
“ascription” (actors playing their given roles) and “achievement” 
(agents actively strategizing) within pre-capitalist and capitalist 
societies respectively. The fact that these assumptions have long been 
shown to be ethnographically misleading (Finnegan, 1970; Goody, 
1996; Saberwal, 1998; Wallman, 1975) has not much altered their 
enduring influence. For a scathing critique of such dualisms as 
achievement and ascription as merely “words, treated as logical 
contradictions,” see Faris (1953: 105). Moreover, the pairs that are 
culturally salient, and their relative valuations, vary throughout space 
and time. For example, Japanese oppositions such as uchi (inside) and 
soto (outside) are uniquely elaborated in that culture (Borovoy, 2005). 
Moreover, the valuations placed upon each side also vary. Not 
everyone worships the workaholic Wall Street warrior. To the contrary, 
in the early decades of the rise of the British middle class, many men 
viewed their business careers as necessary antecedents to time better 
spent on domestic, religious, and cultural pursuits (Davidoff and Hall, 
1987; Creed, 2000 gives further examples). Finally, these dichotomies 
are not purely opposites, and tend to be fluid if not always overtly 
contested (Rotman, 2006; see generally Comaroff, 1987). 
What then remains of value in the yin-yang metaphor? For a 
start, yin-yang self- advertises as a metaphor with no concrete 
referent; it simply references the dichotomies we associate, rightly or 
wrongly, with on the one hand kinship and family businesses (FBs) and 
on the other hand commerce and non-family businesses (NFBs). For 
this reason we use the Chinese terms, un-translated; these are in fact 
“untranslatable” (Oshima, 1983: 65). Moreover, the yin- yang 
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metaphor raises our central questions in this essay.  “Throughout the 
chain [yang] is superior to [yin] but the two are mutually dependent. 
China tends to treat opposites as complementary, the West as 
conflicting” (Graham, 1989: 331). Although the orthodox strain of 
Chinese classical scholarship has regarded yin and yang as 
“dynamically harmonious” and not “antagonistic”, they have also been 
seen as “not entirely balanced” (Cheng, 2008: 219, 231). The yin-
yang metaphor therefore leaves open the question of the relationship 
between the two sides. More strongly, it poses that question itself. In 
its earliest known form, yin and yang referred to the “mutually 
destructive” forces of water and fire (Allen, 1997: 58). Only with the 
elaboration of yin-yang cosmology around 250 B.C. did they come to 
represent “the complementary forces that imbue and define all life” (as 
above). The metaphor therefore raises the central question for family 
firms, are kinship and business primarily complementary or 
contradictory? 
Moreover, the yin-yang metaphor is not merely a literary 
device.  By forcing the terms into binary opposites it may create 
something of a caricature, but by the same token it draws in sharp 
relief the potential for considerable discrepancies of evaluation across 
these domains. Here we must assume that to some extent actual 
behavior regarding roles of kinship and of business bears some 
resemblance to Dualism One, if not of Two and Three. Certainly it is 
not uncommon for the domains of business and kinship to be culturally 
considered as “very different in their essence” (De Lima, 2000: 152). 
An example from the ethnographic record is a young man who, in the 
yin domain, is a “pet” child, but in the yang an incompetent successor 
(Hamabata, 1990: 43; Ram & Holliday, 1993).  This is an example in 
which the mixing of yin and yang represents a cost born by the 
business. Managing a family firm is at its heart an effort to reconcile 
such dichotomies (Colli, 2003: 67; Jones, 2005; Stewart, 2003). 
Empirical studies of family firm performance give evidence to the 
double-edged sword of the mixture.  Literature reviews in these 
studies adopt a stance of “on one hand, on the other hand”; the family 
firm has benefits like lower paid workers; it has costs like employees 
(not all of them kin) with senses of entitlement. 
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Structural domains and entrepreneurship  
The concept of structural domains also resonates with the 
foundational theory of entrepreneurship within anthropology.  First, 
however, we must make an ethnographic assumption: that in many 
cultures, kinship is at least a widely adopted idiom that reflects the 
deepest moral values of the culture (Bloch, 1973; Peletz 2001; Song, 
1999: 82-83; Steadman, Palmer & Tilley, 1996; Stewart, 1990). If so, 
it may be that these domains are in practice – on the ground - quite 
distinct, such that the same resources, say, personal networks or 
potential employees, are discrepantly valued in each, such that a 
classic form of entrepreneurial opportunity arises. As Barth argued in 
his seminal paper, “economic spheres in Darfur,” “entrepreneurs will 
direct their activity pre-eminently towards those points of an economic 
system where the discrepancies of evaluation are the greatest, and will 
attempt to create bridging transactions” (Barth, 1967: 171; Stewart, 
1990; 2003). 
An example of higher valuation than in the yin world than the 
yang: a modestly profitable venture, not very interesting in financial 
terms, but an opportunity for reuniting scattered kin (Bruun, 1993: 
32; Greenhalgh, 1994).  An example of higher valuation in the yang 
world than the yin: the ability to keep a confidence for many years 
(Benedict, 1968; Marcus with Hall, 1992: Chap. 4).  Discretion is 
useful with clandestine bedroom arrangements but materially more 
useful with clandestine boardroom agreements.  Marcus (1992: 131) 
argued that kinship networks have a unique capacity to provide 
linkages, “to make secret deals, … to pull together resources from 
across various social and institutional spheres to pursue a single aim… 
[because] they integrate functions and activities that specialized 
institutional orders differentiate and fragment.” For example, for 
families that own small businesses, kinship is the source of the 
“synthesis” needed to patch together “multiple incomes, from multiple 
sources, with multiple fallback positions” (Creed, 2000: 343). 
Yin and yang in scholarly research 
Another suggestion that these dichotomies refer to matters “in 
the real world” can be found in the scholarly division of labor. Stewart 
(2008) examined the structure of topical attention (that is, the 
network amongst topics) for 14 fields of study, comparing their 
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attention to topics along the “familial” and “commercial” poles.  He 
found that some fields clustered together along the familial pole, some 
along the commercial pole, and some were rather more balanced in 
coverage. As represented by their foregrounded topics (in abstracts of 
articles) strategy, economics, marketing and finance clustered tightly 
together around the commercial pole, with entrepreneurship so highly 
skewed in that direction as to be less highly correlated. Anthropology, 
family and marital therapy, history, law, and sociology clustered tightly 
around the familial pole, with psychology alone very highly correlated 
with family and marital therapy. 
Business school scholars, therefore, organize their efforts as if 
they subscribe to the concepts of structural domains. Their division of 
labor reflects a skewing to either the yin or the yang, with few fields of 
study well balanced between the two.1 To the extent that a field 
considers a given yin topic (such as emotions), it is more inclined to 
consider others (such as secrecy), and less inclined to consider the 
yang topics (such as investments or arbitrage). The reverse is also 
true. To date, qualitative overviews of the costs and benefits of kinship 
in firms have been based on yin-oriented scholarship: from 
anthropology (Stewart, 2003), Chinese history (Whyte, 1996), and 
family studies (Mattessich & Hill, 1976). Empirical research on family 
firm performance has been conducted instead in yang-oriented fields 
such as economics, finance and strategy. Therefore, we turn next to a 
qualitative overview based on this sort of scholarship, followed by a 
summary of the findings about performance. 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Kinship in 
Business 
Family businesses are among the oldest forms of business 
organization, with the earliest records dating back at least to 1900 
BCE (Goody, 1996: 138).  Some currently active family firms have 
extremely long histories, especially in the context of the turbulent 
starting, stopping and restructuring of firms of all types. The first 
recorded family business that continued into the modern era was 
                                                          
1 Family business, as reflected by the Family Business Review, was found to be fairly well 
balanced, as was public administration and policy. Fields of study tended to converge more in full 
texts coverage of topics, with entrepreneurship and strategy remaining the most skewed to the 
commercial and family and marital therapy, and psychology, the most skewed to the familial. 
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Kongo Jumi, started in Japan in 578 A.D and lasting through 40 
generations before its liquidation in 2006.  Surviving, very old family 
firms include Hoshi Ryokan (Japan, est. 718), the Chateau de Goulaine 
vineyard (France, est. 1,000) and the Marinelli foundry (Italy, est. 
1339). By North American standards, very old family firms include 
Shirley Plantation (est. 1613), Zildjian (est. 1623, albeit in 
Constantinople before moving to the U.S. in1929), Laird and Company 
(U.S.A., est. 1780), and Molson’s Brewery (Canada, est. 1786) 
(Anonymous, 2007). In some countries, such as Germany, firms often 
remain in the control of the same family for several generations 
(Erhardt, Nowak, & Weber, 2005; see generally Church, 1993). 
Family businesses have been and remain important despite 
having a particularly complex form of business organization (Danes et 
al.,2002; Haddadj, 2003; Nordqvist, Hall, & Melin, 2009; Ram & 
Holliday, 1993; Schwass, 2005). That is because of the integration and 
interrelationships between the business organization, its structure and 
the family with its hierarchy. In the face of this complexity, the family 
business form has proven resilient; it is not a passing phase of 
development (Colli, 2003; Church, 1993). “By far the dominant form 
of controlling ownership in the world is… by families” (La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999: 496).  Such ownership is important even 
amongst U.S. public firms.  For example, approximately one-third of 
the Standard and Poor’s 500 firms have founding family members still 
in the management. This means that, in some way, the family 
continues some influence on the operation and outcomes of these 
major business organizations. Additionally, family business is popular 
all over the world. For example, over 50 percent of the firms in Asia 
and almost 45 percent of the firms in Europe are controlled by families 
(Claessens, DjanKoo & Lang, 2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002). Also, 
business groups are a major form of business operations in Latin 
America and they are commonly family-controlled as well (Luo & 
Chung, 2005). The lengthy history and ubiquity of family firms 
suggests that they must enjoy some advantages over other forms of 
business organization and ownership. 
Advantages of Kinship in Business 
The writings on the performance effects of family involvement 
cite four main areas in which family involvement generates an 
advantage: (1) internal coordination, (2) monitoring of agents, (3) 
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long-term commitment, and (4) external relationships. One suggested 
reason for the first of these advantages, better internal coordination, is 
lower costs for transactions between internal units and between 
individuals and boundary spanners within the organization (Khanna & 
Palepu, 2000). This is because family business encourages information 
dissemination, more so than other forms of organization. Thus, when 
disputes arise, the conflict is usually resolved in a more efficient 
manner with fewer negative outcomes because of the commitment to 
the organization and the personal incentives to ensure that the firm is 
successful. In short, information is shared because of greater trust and 
family norms that encourage conciliation (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & 
Very, 2007; Peng, 2004). 
Second, the traditional view is that family business 
organizations typically have lower agency costs (compare Schulze et 
al., 2001).  One reason is that family members are concerned about 
the family, their family’s reputation and about the business owned by 
the family. There is such an integration of the family business and the 
family as a unit that family members are much less likely to take 
actions that are in their own self-interest but not in the interest of the 
family business or the family. Moreover, controlling families “have 
strong incentives to monitor carefully” any hired managers, and they 
may have idiosyncratic knowledge that facilitates their controls 
(Andres, 2008: 433; also Saito, 2008). 
The third advantage claimed for family firms stem from a long-
term commitment to the enterprise. The close integration of family 
and firm generates a strong socio-emotional endowment or 
commitment to the family business (Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Nunez-
Nickel, Jacobson & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007). Family members are 
concerned about the reputation of the business because it reflects on 
the family name. Furthermore, if the family business succeeds, it 
contributes to the well being, financially and otherwise of the family as 
well as to the family members’ standing in the community. As a result, 
firms with long-term family control are regarded as less likely than 
other firms to default on their obligations, and consequently enjoy a 
lower cost of debt (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003). 
Sirmon and Hitt (2003) argued that family businesses often 
have more patient capital and survivability capital. This means that the 
family and individual family members are more willing to risk their 
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personal capital for a longer period of time to ensure that the success 
of their business. Additionally, even more distant family members may 
be willing to provide extra financial capital when the business is under 
financial duress, such as in the global economic crisis experienced in 
2009. Thus, family businesses often have access to special types of 
capital through family members and, therefore, may not have to seek 
funds from independent external sources.  External sources of capital 
often place restrictions on the use of the capital, require shorter-term 
repayments, and charge higher rates of interest. As a result, family 
businesses often are able to take a longer-term view and act in ways 
that display greater strategic persistence (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). 
Thus, family businesses may be able to stay with a strategy longer to 
ensure that it will be successful rather than trying to take actions in 
the short-term that satisfy external constituents. 
This independence of action allows family firms to take actions, 
such as R&D investments, that may generate their returns only in the 
longer term (Allouche et al., 2008). Increasing investments in R&D 
should provide greater innovations and, thus, allow the firm to 
introduce new and highly competitive products into the marketplace. 
Furthermore, if firms enter international markets effectively (that is, 
they choose the appropriate markets to enter and enter in ways that 
allow them to be successful), internationalization should allow the firm 
to enhance its economies of scale and scope (Hitt, Hoskisson & Kim, 
1997). 
Finally, a family builds up external social capital over time and 
passes it down to successor generations. Such social capital over time 
is less assured in a typical business organization as much social capital 
is often tied to the individual rather than the organization as such. 
There may be more continuity of membership in family firms than in 
non-family firms. Family businesses may also display more altruistic 
actions to employees and to the external community they serve than 
other forms of business organizations. Chrisman, Chua and 
Kellermanns (2009: 743) found support for their hypothesis that 
family firms develop better “long-term stable relationships that depend 
on external collaboration,” with the result that family firms gain a 
significantly greater performance benefit from external social capital 
than do non- family firms. 
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Disadvantages of Kinship in Business 
Whereas this literature proposes four advantages of family firm, 
six disadvantages are noted. Moreover, these disadvantages are cited 
more frequently than the advantages. This skewing towards the costs 
not benefits contrasts with the more sanguine overviews noted above 
in anthropology, Chinese history and family studies. Perhaps these 
fields are more attuned to the yin domain, which provides “softer” 
benefits that are hard to quantify. Perhaps, of course, this more yang-
oriented literature is simply more realistic. Moreover, all six 
disadvantages should be interpreted in the context of entrenched 
family control, which is non uncommon but not universal in family 
firms. In any case, the six disadvantages are (1) management that is 
less entrepreneurial and less flexible, (2) agency conflicts between 
controlling and minority owners, (3) weaker governance that tolerates 
mediocre management, (4) a bias towards heirs regardless of 
capabilities and poor preparation of successors due to indulgence 
(parental altruism), (5) limitations in their mobilization of non-family 
talent, and (6) higher levels of conflict. 
The first disadvantage is that family businesses may be 
reluctant to take risks. For example, prior research has found that 
family businesses are often cautious about investing in higher risk 
industries (Luo & Chung, 2005). Additionally, there is a higher 
potential for path dependence in the learning and decision making of 
family businesses because of the heavy employment of family 
members. This characteristic sometimes leads to more incremental 
changes and fewer risky decisions and strategies employed (Nordqvist, 
2005).  Thus, while family businesses have greater discretion allowing 
them to take a longer term view, they may not do so because of the 
risk often associated with these longer-term actions. Due to the 
emotional link between family and firm, controlling families seek to 
preserve existing capital and therefore to resist the creative 
destruction that is inherent in the entrepreneurial process (Fogel, 
2006; Morck, Strangeland, & Yeung, 2000; Morck & Yeung, 2003; 
Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007 is consistent with this argument despite their 
distinctions). 
Just as family firms may be less entrepreneurial, they may also 
be less adaptive. For example, it is rare for a family firm to engage in 
downsizing or downscoping (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998). Family 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Entrepreneurship and Family Business (Advances in Entrepreneurship, Firm Emergence and Growth), Vol. 12 (2010): pg. 
243-276. DOI. This article is © Emerald Group Publishing Ltd. and permission has been granted for this version to appear 
in e-Publications@Marquette. Emerald Group Publishing Ltd. does not grant permission for this article to be further 
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Ltd. 
12 
members often are the primary managers of the major units in the 
family firm and, thus, it is uncommon for those units to be closed, sold 
off or outsourced. The family’s altruism also extends to long-time 
employees and making downsizing decisions less attractive to family 
businesses as well (Ram & Holliday, 1993). While the unwillingness to 
harm loyal employees has advantages, it limits the flexibility of the 
firm to make strategic readjustments as the competitive landscape 
and/or economic environment change. 
The second disadvantage, of conflicts between controlling and 
minority shareholders (sometimes called the second agency problem), 
does not necessarily follow from the owning family’s wish for control.  
Rather, it follows from a desire to leverage family wealth, often tied up 
in the firm, with outside investors’ equity.  This can lead to the use of 
mechanisms that create a “wedge” between their “control [and their] 
sheer equity stake” (Villalonga & Amit, 2009: 3048). The most widely 
used wedges are differential board membership, classes of stock with 
differential voting rights, and chains of ownership (pyramids) that can 
generate ultimate control well in excess of their equity stake. 
Consequently the controlling owners can provide themselves cash and 
salary benefits, “potentially biased related third-party transactions” 
and other benefits at odds with the interests of minority shareholders 
(Achmad et al., 2009: 42; also Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Andres, 2008; 
Fogel, 2006; Morck, Strangeland, & Yeung, 2000; Morck & Yeung, 
2003; Sciasia & Mazzola, 2008). 
The family’s desire for control conflicts with “strict adherence to 
wealth maximization” (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003: 264). If the 
owning family’s control is entrenched – hard to discipline with market 
forces – they face less favorable access to external equity markets as 
well (Andres, 2008; Chua & Chrisman, 2004; Morck, Wolfenson, & 
Yeung, 2005). Thus, this second agency problem results in discounted 
valuations of the firm in the financial markets (Villalonga & Amit, 
2009). Further, despite a lower cost of debt, family firms may be 
reluctant to take a chance on default and only cautiously use debt to 
leverage their equity (Allouche et al., 2008). 
The family’s desire for control also leads to the third 
disadvantage, weaker governance that tolerates weaker management. 
Independent boards are correlated with higher firm performance but 
obviously not with the independent discretion of the owning family. As 
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a result, many family firms operate with weak governance 
mechanisms, most obviously by means of boards with few outside 
members and very few members who are truly independent of the 
owners. These boards in turn are reluctant to question the owning 
families’ decisions or actions (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Lubatkin et al., 2005; Westhead & 
Howorth, 2006). It is less common to see managers replaced, 
particularly if they are members of the family or have strong linkages 
to the family. As a result, ineffective managers may remain in 
leadership positions much longer than they would in nonfamily 
businesses (Gómez-Mejía, Núñez-Nickel & Gutierrez, 2001). 
Weaker boards are also less inclined to question the succession 
to leadership roles of less qualified members of the family (the fourth 
disadvantage). Family businesses can therefore suffer from nepotism 
(Schulze et al, 2001). They may fail to select individuals who have the 
strongest human capital for key positions. This is almost inevitable 
based on limiting the available talent pool to kin (Bennedsen et al., 
2007).  Moreover, the controlling family may compound this problem 
by failing to prepare their offspring to be competent, independent 
adults rather than indulged children (Lubatkin et al., 2005; Ram & 
Holliday, 1993; Song, 1999: 87). Financial markets apparently assume 
that this outcome is most likely because they react to scions’ 
successions by discounting the shares (Morck & Yeung, 2003). 
The fifth disadvantage follows from the preferential treatment of 
family members and the reluctance to share control with non-family 
members.  The differentially favorable promotion and compensation of 
family members, and the reluctance to share stock ownership, make it 
difficult to promote and compensate non-kin appropriately. As a result, 
family firms fail to take full advantage of external labor markets 
(Chua, Chrisman, & Bergiel, 2009; Gedajlovic, Lubatkin, & Schulze, 
2004). 
The sixth disadvantage refers to the yin domain (Stewart, 
2008): interpersonal conflicts. Not surprisingly, then, it received little 
attention in this literature. It does not go unnoticed nonetheless. A 
greater prevalence of conflict is proposed for relations between kin and 
non-kin, and amongst kin, particularly over contested successions 
(Lubatkin et al., 2005; Miller et al., 2009; Minichilli, Corbetta, & 
MacMillan, 2010; Sciascia & Mazzola, 2008). 
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Performance Effects of Family Involvement 
What then is the net effect of the costs and benefits of kinship 
involvement in business? Table One summarizes 32 empirical studies 
that offer an answer in terms of the effect on firm performance. We 
distinguish, as do the studies, between family involvement in 
management (FIM) and family involvement in ownership (FIO), and 
between accounting or operating measures (such as sales growth) and 
financial market measures. Naturally the latter measures cannot be 
used with privately held firms, which it will be seen represent a 
minority of the samples despite being a majority of family firms.  
Accordingly we also distinguish between studies with samples of 
traded, public firms from those with non-traded, private firms, and 
those with mixed samples. The sample for Bennedsen and colleagues 
(2007) is mixed but must presumably be primarily private, considering 
the large number of firms (5,334 that experienced a succession) within 
a small country (Denmark). The sample for Minichilli, Corbetta and 
MacMillan is 73% private (67/92)/ 
 
                          Table One 
 
Performance effects for private firms 
Distinguishing between public and private samples draws in 
sharp relief the differences in performance effects. The broad brush 
picture is clear. Family involvement has a positive effect for the public 
firms and a negative effect for the private firms. For example, there 
are five random samples of private firms. (These are marked with an 
asterisk. Chrisman, Chua and Kellermanns (2009) used a random 
sample of a convenience sample: SBDC clients.)  In two of these 
studies (Smith, 2008; Westhead & Howorth, 2006), family influence 
has an insignificant or quite specific negative effect. In one sample 
(Schulze et al., 2001), the negative effect is an opportunity cost 
because the only positive effect is found in the absence of family 
influence. In the other two studies (Jorissen et al., 2005 and Sciasia & 
Mazzola, 2008), family influence has a significant negative effect.  All 
of these five studies considered both FIM and FIO, with the exception 
of Jorissen and colleagues, which considered FIO. Further, the 
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sophisticated large sample study by Bennedsen and colleagues (2007), 
which used the random sex of the firstborn as an instrument for 
succession, found significant negative effects of FIM. As previously 
noted, we can assume that most firms in this sample were private.  
Two of the findings of Minichilli and colleagues present puzzles for 
future research. They found that private family firms outperform public 
private firms. They also found a U shaped (not inverted U shaped) 
effect of family involvement on performance, which they attribute to 
diminishing and increasing schisms in families as more become 
involved in management. 
Performance effects for public firms 
Empirical results are more complex for public family firms, with 
several studies reporting non-linear effects and different results 
depending on the level of family involvement.  Several studies also 
distinguish between the founding generation and succeeding heirs, 
with the former outperforming the latter. In fact, Fogel (2006) and 
Saito (2008) argue that the positive effects that have been found may 
be driven by founders who are, after all, unusually successful having 
taken their businesses public. That is, the positive results might better 
be construed as entrepreneurial effects rather than family effects. 
Lower performance for heirs than for non-descendents or founders was 
found by several of the public sample studies (Anderson, Mansi & 
Reeb, 2003; Andres, 2008; Morck, Strangeland & Yeung, 2000; Pérez-
González, 2006; Saito, 2008; Villalonga & Amit, 2006; for mixed 
samples by Barth et al., 2005 and by Bennedsen et al., 2007; for 
private samples by Barontoni & Caprio, 2006; Erhardt et al., 2005; 
Saito, 2008). 
However, in contrast with the findings for private firms, only one 
of the studies (Achmad et al., 2009) found an overall negative effect, 
and they found this in a low shareholder protection environment 
(Indonesia). Moreover, 14 of the 18 studies found positive effects of 
family involvement, given a variety of contingencies such as level of 
control, generation, and HRM practices. 
Practitioner Implication: Professionalize 
An obvious implication of the negative effects of family for 
private firms and positive effects for public firms is that family firms 
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ought to professionalize their management and governance (as 
recommended by Schulze et al., 2001; Sciascia & Mazzola, 2008; 
Westhead & Howorth, 2006). Martínez, Stöhr, & Quiroga (2007: 93) 
made the case as follows: “when family-controlled firms 
professionalize their management and governance bodies, and have to 
be accountable to minority shareholders, they can overcome most of 
their traditional weaknesses and take advantage of their strengths and 
succeed.” 
This sanguine conclusion makes sense for several reasons. First, 
it is consistent with a finding we can call the “Goldilocks” effect. There 
is a level of family involvement in ownership and involvement in 
management that is optimal: not too little and not too much. For 
example, Sirmon, Arregle, Hitt and Webb (2008) argued that family-
influenced firms (as opposed to family-controlled firms) tended to 
achieve more positive outcomes. For example, the family influence 
allows the positive attributes of a family to be infused into an 
organization while having only a certain level of influence without 
having control limits the potential negative effects of family 
involvement. The research reported by Sirmon and colleagues (2008) 
concluded that firms responding to competitive threats (e.g., imitating 
their strategies) with higher investments in research and development 
and with enhanced internationalization tended to perform at higher 
levels than those who responded by curtailing R&D and 
internationalization. They also found that firms having family influence 
were more likely to respond with these strategic approaches than 
nonfamily firms or family controlled firms. They also found that the 
maximum performance was achieved when families held about 15 
percent of the equity in a firm, which allowed them influence but did 
not allow them control over the firm’s strategies and operations. 
The precise levels for the optimum vary amongst the studies, 
presumably due to different contexts and different definitions of 
“family” involvement.  However, a widespread finding is that 
performance is highest with moderate to moderately high levels of 
involvement (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Barth et al., 2005; Chahine, 
2007; Maury, 2006; however, de Miguel et al., 2004 found instead a U 
shaped curve). These are all studies with samples of public firms, with 
the exception of the mixed sample by Barth and colleagues.  For 
private firms, of course, there cannot be a Goldilocks effect regarding 
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involvement in ownership. Perhaps there could be one regarding 
involvement in management, although in the private firm sample of 
Sciascia and Mazzola (2008) the less the family involvement the 
better. We cannot assume, though, that a hybrid of involvement by 
family insiders and outsiders, or an “open family firm” (Colli, 2003) is 
infeasible in private firms. 
Second, the process of going public brings responsibility to 
external shareholders and regulators, whose expectations and 
procedures have become standardized through legal regimes and 
socialization by business schools and the business media (Tsao et al., 
2009; Zhang & Ma, 2009). Third, family firms with boards independent 
of the controlling family outperform those with boards beholden to the 
family (Anderson & Reeb, 2004). Board independence is a 
characteristic of professional governance. Fourth, firms with non-
family successor CEOs significantly outperform firms with family 
successor CEOs (Anderson, Mansi & Reeb, 2003; Barantoni & Caprio, 
2006; Morck, Strangeland & Yeung, 2000; Pérez-González, 2006; 
Saito, 2008; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). As Bennedsen and colleagues 
(2007: 653) inferred, “professional CEOs [provide] extremely valuable 
services.” 
Transitioning to professional management entails more than 
hiring non-family successors.  More basic is developing a management 
that is more “formalized, standardized, and… scientific” (Zhang and 
Ma, 2009: 133). In short, the transition is one from yin to yang: from 
amateurism to professionalism, informality to formality, secrecy to 
openness, ascription to achievement, and subjectivity to objectivity.  
Such a transition may not require our invocations as management 
scholars; in many cultures it has been found to be the emergent, 
unplanned consequence of coping with the challenges that firms face 
as they grow (Berghoff, 2006; Goody, 1996: 143, 155; Kondo, 1990: 
167ff., Marcus & Hall, 1992: 15-16; Trevinyo-Rodríguez, 2009; Tsui-
Auch, 2004; Zhang & Ma, 2009). The family firm might need to 
professionalize as it faces the urging of governments and increased 
needs for internal coordination, technological capabilities, outside 
financing, and global competitive pressures (Tsui-Auch & Lee, 2003). 
Pressures to professionalize emerge from the kinship end as well. As 
Trevinyo-Rodríguez (2009) noted, the growth of the firm is linear but 
the growth of the kindred is exponential. 
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Many successful family firms do make the conscious decision to 
professionalize, whether by hiring outside CEOs or educating the 
succeeding generation in high quality business schools (Benedict, 
1968; De Lima, 2000; Douglass 1992, 223, 225; Pérez-González, 
2006; Tsui-Auch & Lee, 2003; Tsui-Auch, 2004). Those family firms 
that professionalize may reap performance benefits. In one of the few 
studies of HRM practices in family firms, Tsao and colleagues (2009) 
found that family firms that adopted professional HRM practices 
(termed High Performance Work Systems) outperformed non-family 
firms, whereas those who did not do so underperformed non-family 
firms. Despite these apparent advantages it is clear from the 
performance of private family firms that many have failed to 
professionalize. As Schulze and colleagues (2001: 111) suggested, 
“there may be two types of family firms,” those who professionalize 
and those that do not.  Why might this be so? 
Why Not Professionalize: Lack of Ability 
One answer is that many family firms cannot professionalize. 
This incapacity may result from cognitive, cultural, emotional, and 
managerial causes.  A fundamental cognitive impediment is that family 
business managers can fail to see the need for change. Poza, Hanlon 
and Kishida (2004) found that the perceptions of family firm CEOs and 
parents, were significantly more sanguine regarding their management 
than were other family and non-family managers. Moreover, family 
member CEOs tend to be longer-tenured and less well educated than 
non-family CEOs (Bennedsen et al., 2007; Jorissen et al., 2005; Pérez-
González, 2006). These CEOs might believe that they are doing all 
they can to keep up with change and simply cannot learn any faster 
(Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004). Curiously, however, Tsui-Auch’s (2004) 
study of professionalization among Chinese family firms in Singapore 
found no correlation with educational levels. 
Cultural impediments include the norms of kinship systems that 
are at odds with purely economic rationality. A classic problem for 
entrepreneurs who look to grow their ventures has been called the 
challenge of disembedding (Stewart, 1990). Their need to channel 
resources into their business conflicts with the obligations that flow 
from the webs of kinship within which they and their firms are 
embedded.  In many cultures they are expected to make displays of 
their wealth and to redistribute it generously amongst their kindred. 
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Failure to do so leads to intra- personal and inter-personal conflicts 
(Davidoff & Hall, 1987: 216; Hart, 1975; Marcus with Hall, 1992: 
Chap. 4; Watson, 1985: 163). Further, entrepreneurs might seek to 
include or exclude family members from responsible positions based 
largely on capabilities.  In most kinship systems they enjoy 
considerable latitude, but if they prioritize family membership less than 
expected given the norms of their culture, emotionally painful conflict 
is likely to follow (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; Hamabata, 1990). 
 As this example suggests, cultural impediments are linked with 
emotional impediments. Culture includes expectations about emotions, 
and as components of culture so to does a kinship system. Individuals 
often experience ambivalence about their expected feelings, but this 
ambivalence only serves to give evidence that they have internalized 
the expectations (Peletz, 2001). We have noted a central source of 
ambivalence for family business owners: parents’ recognition that they 
should develop independence in their children but feeling a temptation 
to spoil them. Similarly, siblings might recognize the need to promote 
the most capable scion but still find it hard not to view their own 
offspring as more capable than their nieces and nephews (Forden, 
2001; Tsui-Auch, 2004). The psychological concept used in the family 
business literature to describe this conundrum is “parental altruism” 
(Lubatkin, Schulze & Ling, 2005). In Japanese culture, a similar 
concept that is widely discussed and considered endemic in family 
firms is the indulgence of passive love; in Japanese, amayakasu for 
the giving of indulgence (amae is the noun; Kondo, 1990: 150; the 
classic account is Doi, 1973; a recent comparison with British terms is 
Lewis and Ozaki, 2009). This problem of indulging family members can 
extend to non-family employees as well as family members thanks to 
ideologies of the workplace as a “family” (Ram & Holliday, 1993; 
Smith, 2009). 
Emotional and cultural entanglements such as these make it 
impossible to professionalize a family firm simply by recruiting non-
family managers. Being a “professional” manager in a family firm 
requires the capacity to navigate through idiosyncratic family cultures 
(Hall & Nordqvist, 2008; Lee, Lim & Lim, 2003). Nor can the family 
firm operate just as if it were a non-family firm. Professionalizing HRM 
practices, for example, requires consideration for the firm’s non-
economic goals, long time horizons, and desire to maintain control 
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over the generations, all of which militate against shorter-term or 
stock-based incentives (Chua, Chrisman, & Bergiel, 2009; Gedajlovic, 
Lubatkin, & Schulze, 2004). Efforts to import current HRM practices 
without consideration of the family context can be lead to conflict 
(Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; Hall & Nordqvist, 2008). Similarly, pay 
dispersion in the top management team correlates with significantly 
higher growth in non-family firms but significantly lower growth in 
family firms (Ensley, Pearson, & Sardeshmukh, 2007; also Schulze et 
al., 2001). For these reasons, family firms can find it difficult to 
attract, reward and retain high quality “professional” managers 
(Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006; Beehr, Drexler, & Faulkner, S., 1997; 
Stewart, 2003).  
Why Not Professionalize: Lack of Desire 
Family CEOs could, of course, prefer to maintain the cultures 
and emotional orders of their firms, however non-professional we 
academics might consider them. Moreover, they might view 
professional management as a threat to five of the benefits that they 
currently enjoy: discretionary use of cash flows, maintenance of non-
economic benefits, unique access to resources found uniquely in the 
kinship domain, and secrecy. The first of these benefits applies equally 
to other closely held, private firms and does not explain the apparently 
lower accounting and operating performance of family firms. The same 
desire to reduce taxes and hence reported income applies equally to 
their comparison firms. However, family firm CEOs might have a 
different set of preferences than non-family firm CEOs (Astrachan & 
Jaskiewicz, 2008; Chrisman et al., 2010). They might prefer, as 
Gómez-Mejía and colleagues put it, to preserve their “socioeconomic 
wealth” rather than maximize their financial wealth. For example, only 
the former might have a preference for finding employment for 
relatives, or for maintaining a long- standing company name that 
provides prestige for the family (Berghoff, 2006; Erhardt, Nowak, & 
Weber, 2005). Moreover, the “tunneling” of wealth from the firm to 
the owners’ coffers could be more prevalent in family-controlled than 
in other closely held firms (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; Lomnitz & Pérez-
Lizaur, 1987: 13, 105; 116-117). Consequently the apparently lower 
performance of family firms might not be construed as such by these 
CEOs (Pérez-González, 2006). 
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Professionalizing management could also be seen as a threat to 
the current CEOs’ power, especially if these CEOs are, as often, less 
well educated than their peers (Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004).  They 
could see a threat to their unique access to familial resources.  As 
Greenhalgh (1994: 751) expressed it regarding a Taiwanese “family 
head,” embeddedness in and manipulation of kinship traditions 
enabled him to “build his firm out of the loyalties and talents of his 
family.” This capacity must seem to be worth keeping. Finally, 
professional management could be seen as valuing openness and 
disclosure in contrast with reticence and secrecy (Gedajlovic, Lubatkin, 
& Schulze, 2004; Greenhalgh, 1994; Stewart, 2003). This too could 
seem to be threatening. On balance, then, the family firm may choose 
to retain its “traditional” methods, particularly in functions related to 
control over privileged access to resources such as cash flows and 
executive positions. Therefore we would expect that the most likely 
areas of conflict in efforts to professionalize are financial and HR 
strategy, and governance. 
Why Not Professionalize: Lack of a Need 
Professionalizing might not be possible and it might not be 
desired. It might also not be needed. The firm’s situation might not 
require the transition. “Cultural and institutional factors” such as the 
need to professionalize, so as to appear legitimate for outsiders, might 
not as yet be salient (Tsui-Auch, 2004: 713).  The prevailing 
managerial culture might also be unsympathetic to the transition 
(Whyte, 1996; Zhang & Ma, 2009). The competitive environment 
might not require changes if niches are small, markets fragmented, 
and environments dynamic (Gedajlovic, Lubatkin, & Schulze, 2004).  
In such cases the firm will also not experience internal pressures for 
professionalizing so as to deal with increasing scale, R&D intensity, or 
marketing sophistication (Lin & Hu, 2007). 
These arguments have assumed that firms “fail” to 
professionalize, rather than stick wisely to their course. We should 
reflect on this. Have we assumed the validity of Structural Dualism 
Three, the managerial variant of yin-yang ideology? Have we 
undersold the value for business of such yin qualities as informality, 
nurturance, and subjectivity?  Qualities such as these offer 
opportunities for deploying resources from the yin domain, where they 
generate low profits, to the yang domain where they generate 
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competitive advantage (following Barth, 1967). Further, the 
assumption that a category called “family firms” should be subsumed 
under yin may be misleading, for three reasons.  First, it might be 
based on inadequate or faulty observations. Second, while yin qualities 
might characterize some family firms they might not for others. 
“Family firms” are homogenous (Colli, 2003; Croutsche & Ganidis, 
2008; Lin & Hu, 2007). Third, we cannot assume that all the yin 
qualities more strongly correlate with one another rather than with 
yang, and vice versa; that is, we ought not to draw “vertical” 
inferences from the dualisms (Rutherford, 2010). Doing so, as Graham 
(1989: 338) has argued, is an error typical of “protoscientific” 
thinking. 
We need moreover to be cautious in our assumptions about the 
meaning of professional management in family firms. As Hall and 
Nordqvist (2008) have argued, the professional manager in the family 
firm has to be astute regarding both yin and yang, to return to our 
metaphor. For this reason, it could be misleading to argue that 
succession by heirs gives evidence of drawing on a limited talent pool, 
because the talent of value might be idiosyncratic. We need therefore 
to be cautious in equating non-family CEO successions with a 
professional transition (as with Bennedsen et al., 2007; Lin & Hu, 
2007; Zhang & Ma, 2009). Non-family CEOs might be amateurs just as 
family managers might be professionals (Hall & Nordqvist, 2008). 
We should also recall the thesis from agency theory that 
introducing non-family managers introduces conflicts of interest 
between the owners and their agents, the managers (Chua, Chrisman, 
& Bergiel, 2009; Lee, Lim, & Lim, 2003). Introducing these managers 
also introduces what Leonard Sayles disparaged as “Generally 
Accepted Management Principles (GAMP)”, which looks to solve 
ongoing coordination challenges by means of command and control. 
Observational studies over several decades have shown that this 
abstract, yang-oriented approach fails whereas “work flow 
entrepreneurship” by lower level employees succeeds (Sayles & 
Stewart, 1995; Smith, 2009: 81-86). Further, the evidence favoring 
professional” management in entrepreneurial ventures is weak. 
Willard, Krueger and Feeser (1992) failed to find evidence that 
professionally managed high growth ventures outperformed founder-
managed high growth ventures. On balance, we should be cautious 
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about equating family firms with amateurism and non-family firms 
with professionalism. 
Cause for Caution: Limitations in Current 
Knowledge 
Practitioners, were they to examine empirical research on family 
firm performance, might not be inclined to draw any managerial 
implications. The studies are carefully crafted and many are clever. 
However, they are not without serious limitations. We have noted the 
skewing to public firms. Absent a theoretical interest in public family 
firms as such – which is rare – this amounts to biased convenience 
sampling (Combs, 2008; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; 
Morck & Yeung, 2003; Schulze & Gedajlovic, 2010). Only five studies 
are based on random samples of private firms; clearly more are 
needed (Chrisman et al., 2010). 
Naturally enough, performance studies exhibit the usual 
tradeoffs of survey research. For example, this research is 
overwhelmingly cross-sectional (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; there are 
exceptions such as Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). However, changes in 
family systems have major impacts on family firms (Aldrich & Cliff, 
2003; Greenhalgh, 1994; Whyte, 1996), and families and households 
are systematically misrepresented without attention to the domestic 
life cycle (Goody, 1996; Harrell, 1997; Robertson, 1991). For family 
firm entrepreneurs, knowledge of when kinship is a resource requires a 
keen attention to timing and kinship dynamics (Aldrich & Cliff, 2003; 
Stewart, 1990). 
Survey research such as these studies gives up contextual depth 
in favor of generalizability.  Yet for practitioners, context is everything: 
just when it is that connections from the yin domain are a resource, a 
hindrance or irrelevant is entirely situational (Wallman, 1975; also 
Astrachan & Jaskiewicz, 2008; Harrell, 1997: 36; Sahlins, 1972: 198-
199). This research does attend to certain contexts such as countries, 
albeit with yang-oriented concerns such as shareholder protection 
regulations (Allouche et al., 2008; Fogel, 2006; Khanna & Yafeh, 
2007; Smith, 2008). However, as others have noted, we need more 
research on “family-related differences [such as] variations in 
inheritance structures or marriage norms” Bertrand and Schoar, 2006: 
94; also Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). Very little attention is paid in these 
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performance studies to country histories (Church, 1993) or societal 
factors that particularly impact family structures (Jones, 2005). 
Examples of such factors are the socialization of reproduction 
(Robertson, 1991: 128) and the legal regimes as they affect family 
firms. For example, the “distinction [that] is often made between 
ancestral and self-acquired property” (Goody, 1997: 455) has 
profound implications for power relations and conflicts in Chinese 
family firms (for the example of Chinese family firms, 
Greenhalgh,1994; for conflicts therein Oxfeld 1993: 191-196). With 
some exceptions (e.g., Jorissen et al., 2005), this research also pays 
little attention to individual or demographic variables, which are 
important for understanding family firms (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; 
Danes, Stafford & Loy, 2007). Most strikingly, only two of the studies, 
and none of the five random sample private firm studies, have any 
data at all on kinship itself. The family is treated as a “’black box’” 
(Creed, 2000: 346). The studies also dichotomize their samples into 
family and non-family firms in various ways, whereas the “degree… 
and mode” of kinship involvement is not “an either-or scenario” 
(Sharma, 2004: 4). 
Survey research tends to have the sorts of limitations we have 
noted. It cannot be expected to examine the subtle realities of 
management. Unfortunately, qualitative researchers, who could 
contribute to this puzzle, have little to offer on the inner workings of 
family firms. Sorely lacking from our literature are extensive, in-depth 
studies by social scientists on kinship and business within particular 
firms (Nordqvist, Hall, & Melin, 2009). We know of no studies 
comparable to studies of non-family business such classics as Bower 
(1970), Dalton (1959), Gouldner (1951), and Pettigrew (1986). It is 
true that there are useful journalistic books on business families, 
especially prominent ones such as the Bronfmans (Faith, 2006), 
Dasslers (Smit, 2008), Guccis (Forden, 2001) and Guggenheims 
(Unger & Unger, 2005). It is also true that historical studies can be 
helpful, such as Fruin (1983) on the “Kikkoman company, clan and 
community” and Watson (1985) on the Teng lineage of Ha Tsuen in 
southern China. 
Monograph-length ethnographies of family firms, however, are 
notable for their absence. Perhaps these will begin to appear as the 
family business field emerges; perhaps doctoral students are working 
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on family firm ethnographies as we write this. If so, they might also be 
capable and interested in the study of both the yin and yang domains 
and of the interplay between them.  One likely reason for the dearth of 
such studies, however, is likely to remain. Access into the field is a 
challenge for organizational ethnography of any description. Family 
firm access is more challenging yet. Gatekeepers of these firms are 
accustomed to privacy and may well be concerned that sensitive family 
matters might be publicized should they grant researchers up-close, 
long-term access to their domains. Opportunistic use of pre-existing 
connections such as consultancy roles may prove to be necessary, as it 
was also for Dalton, Gouldner, Pettigrew and other organizational 
ethnographers.2 Bower’s access, by contrast, was gained through 
“time and care” (personal communication), although it surely helped, 
as with Hamabata (1990), to have an elite affiliation (Harvard 
University). 
Near exceptions to the dearth of in-depth field studies include 
two books about Japanese family businesses by Japanese-American 
scholars, Hamabata (1990) and Kondo (1990). Each is well worth 
reading by family business scholars but neither has a great deal to say 
about business as such. Their focus – Hamabata’s especially – is on yin 
not yang.  Both these books demonstrate that there can be much of 
value for family business scholars from studies that look at the 
business side from the family side, rather than the reverse. These 
books and other, familial oriented studies such as Davidoff and Hall 
(1987), Douglass (1992), Hamilton (2006), Smith (2009), and Zwick 
(2004), reveal complex “set[s] of mutual connections” between 
“market [and] family” (Davidoff & Hall, 1987: 32). Typically they find 
important roles of women who, with apparently only private, domestic 
roles, influence public affairs, often through networks of other women 
(Davidoff & Hall, 1987: 202, 227; also Bruun, 1993: 22; di Leonardo, 
1987; Lomnitz & Pérez-Lizaur, 1987: 118; Robertson, 1991: 41; 
Rotman, 2006). Hamabata, for example, found that very wealthy 
Japanese women conducted transactions through their natal kin; this 
is unexpected in a strongly patrilocal society (1990: 28). However, 
these studies fail to pursue the kinship-business connection very far at 
all into the business domain. 
                                                          
2 Jenny Helin is currently doing just this for her dissertation at Jönköping International Business 
School. 
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In this they reflect an unfortunate division of scholarly labor. 
Yin-oriented scholars have shown little interest in the yang.  As Plath 
has lamented, in his review of Kondo’s work, “research on family… 
[has been] intellectually ghettoed from research on work or industrial 
organization” (1991: 417; also Aldrich & Cliff, 2003; Smith, 2009: 8-
11).  Yang-oriented scholars have, for their part, marginalized yin-
oriented subjects such as family firms – at least the family firm 
aspects of these firms (Jones, 2005; Stewart, 2008). Because of this 
disjunction, our knowledge base is limited. We know that most firms 
are profoundly embedded in kinship and marriage. We know that yin 
and yang have complex inter-connections (Creed, 2000; Schwass, 
2005; Smith, 2009). We have reason to consider these connections to 
be, on balance, complementary.  We have reason to think that the 
management of “the overlap between the family and the business” is 
crucial for family firm performance (Olson et al., 2003: 661; Sharma, 
2004). However, we know little of the situational logics or the 
strategizing of managers, the human agents who navigate the 
boundaries of the yin and the yang. In just what ways, in what 
situations, do family business entrepreneurs profit from bridging the 
domains? We await the answers. Until such time as we gain a deeper 
grasp of these questions we ought to be cautious about prescribing the 
best course of action for particular family firms. 
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Table 1. Summary of Empirical Studies of the Effect of Family Involvement 
on Firm Performance. 
 
 
* random sample. Chrisman et al. 2009 is a random sample of a convenience 
sample (SBDC clients).                                                                                           
** "This means that performance decreases as FIM increases, and the 
decrease is more noticeable at higher levels of FIM" (p. 340). 
 
